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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A RY
The debate on EU-Turkey cooperation in the 
field of migration has so far largely focused on 
the so-called “EU-Turkey deal.” This paper takes 
the debate one step further by reflecting on the 
overlooked financial and institutional component 
of the deal, namely the institutionalized support 
Turkey has been receiving from the EU to bolster 
refugee integration in Turkey. It argues that the 
discussion on migration cooperation between 
Turkey and the EU should move toward issues 
concerning rights-based good governance aiming at 
cohesion and employing effective inter-institutional 
cooperation in the design and implementation of 
policies toward the refugees who already reside 
in Turkey and in EU member countries. We 
believe that this is significant primarily for two 
reasons. One is that the overwhelming focus on the 
EU-Turkey migration deal has played a toxic role in 
the overall EU-Turkey relationship, with the deal 
itself being subject to political bargaining and joint 
accusations breeding substantive mistrust on both 
sides. Secondly, the existing research suggests that 
a vast majority of refugees in Turkey do not bear the 
intention to leave the country, which already hosts 
over four million refugees. This means that Turkey 
is facing similar long-term governance-related 
challenges to other EU member states such as 
Germany, which also hosts a considerable number 
of refugees. An EU-Turkey cooperation designed 
on such premises would not only strengthen the 
integration of refugees in Turkey but also entail 
the prospect of making a fundamental pillar of 
EU-Turkey cooperation less transactional and, 
thus, the relationship less toxic.
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I N T RODUCT ION
In the summer of 2015, close to one million Syrian 
refugees transited through Turkey and risked their 
lives crossing the Aegean Sea in hopes of seeking 
protection in Europe. The debate over the arrival of 
refugees in Europe was leading to a political crisis 
in the EU as no agreement could be reached on how/
where to distribute inflows of refugees within Euro-
pean territory to ease the burden on border countries. 
Therefore, efforts turned to addressing the issue with 
countries of transit and origin, most notably Turkey, 
as the country was facing a huge refugee influx. 
In the fall of 2015, the EU and Turkey entered into 
high-level policy dialogues to address this common 
migration challenge. This was also seen as an 
opportunity to re-energize Turkey’s stagnating EU 
accession process. In October 2015, the European 
Commission presented the EU-Turkey Joint Action 
Plan, activated during the November 29, 2015 
EU-Turkey Summit. Then, during the March 18, 2016 
Summit, the EU-Turkey Statement, or better known 
as the “EU-Turkey deal,” was signed, which detailed 
cooperation in supporting Turkey in hosting this 
vast refugee population, curbing irregular migration 
flows to Europe, promoting legal channels for protec-
tion and resettlement in Europe, accelerating visa 
liberalization for Turkey, and re-energizing Turkey’s 
EU accession process. With respect to migration 
management alone, the EU-Turkey deal included 
both a concrete return and resettlement scheme 
to manage irregular migration from Turkey and 
substantial funding (3 billion EUR for 2016-17 and 
another 3 billion EUR for 2018-19) to support Turkey 
in hosting refugees. 
The EU-Turkey deal has received widespread atten-
tion both in the media and academic studies, although 
the focus has tended to be on either the deal overall 
and its implications vis-à-vis EU-Turkey relations 
and the EU’s migration externalization policies, or on 
the returns component of the deal and its impact on 
the rights of asylum seekers and refugees. This paper 
takes the debate one step further by reflecting on the 
overlooked financial and institutional component of 
the deal, namely the institutionalized support Turkey 
has been receiving from the EU to support refugee 
integration in Turkey. It argues that the discussion on 
migration cooperation between Turkey and the EU 
should move toward issues concerning rights-based 
good governance aiming at cohesion and employing 
effective inter-institutional cooperation in the design 
and implementation of policies toward the refugees 
who already reside in Turkey and in EU member 
countries. We believe that this is significant primarily 
for two reasons. One is that the overwhelming focus 
on the EU-Turkey migration deal has played a toxic 
role in the overall EU-Turkey relationship, with the 
deal itself being subject to political bargaining and 
joint accusations breeding substantive mistrust on 
both sides. Secondly, the existing research suggests 
that the vast majority of refugees in Turkey do not 
bear the intention to leave the country, which already 
hosts over four million refugees, meaning that Turkey 
is facing similar long-term governance-related chal-
lenges to other EU member states such as Germany, 
which also hosts a considerable number of refugees. 
While Turkey’s recent incursion into Northern Syria 
may be perceived as an opportunity for the return and 
resettlement of refugees in Syria, this, too—assuming 
that it motivates any returns—would not produce an 
effective solution given the sheer scale of the Syrian 
refugees who are residing in Turkey.
To this end, the paper opens first with an overview 
of how Turkey has responded to the Syrian refugee 
crisis. This is followed by a discussion of the different 
components of EU-Turkey cooperation on migration 
over recent decades and the impact of the refugee 
crisis after 2015, including the EU-Turkey deal, 
detailing in particular its financial and institutional 
components. It then explores the next possible and 
necessary steps in migration cooperation between 
the EU and Turkey. 
5T H E  S Y R I A N  R E F UGE E  C R I SI S  A N D  T U R K E Y ’ S  R E SP ONSE
The Turkish government has been highly proactive 
in providing services and support to refugees since 
the start of refugees’ arrival from Syria in 2011, 
wherein different state actors, ministerial or at 
the provincial and local levels, have been involved 
in the refugee response to different degrees. In the 
initial years of the conflict, the number of refugee 
arrivals was more manageable, with only 225,000 
Syrian refugees registered with Turkish authori-
ties by 2013. Accordingly, Turkey’s initial actions 
focused mainly on emergency response, character-
ized by setting up fully serviced camps for arriving 
refugees, namely Temporary Accommodation 
Centers (TACs), in provinces bordering Syria and 
offering free medical care and education possibili-
ties for all, the latter being provided in Temporary 
Education Centers (TECs). 
However, after 2013 the numbers began to escalate 
drastically, reaching 1.5 million in 2014, 2.5 million 
in 2015, and close to 3.7 million today.1 The TACs 
were not able to accommodate such vast numbers 
of refugees, who started self-settling in the major 
metropolitan centers of Turkey (i.e., Istanbul, 
Ankara, Izmir, Bursa) instead of in border prov-
inces. Today, less than two percent of the refugee 
population in Turkey is accommodated in TACs. 
With the escalation in numbers, the phenomenon 
of urban self-settlement, and the growing recogni-
tion of the protracted nature of the conflict in Syria, 
policy makers began to focus on the question of how 
to integrate this massive population into the host 
society. As a result of these growing challenges, the 
policies on refugees have gradually shifted from 
emergency management to a long-term integration 
approach. 
1 http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik. 
In addition, Turkey also hosts over 360,000 registered refugees and 
asylum seekers from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia, and other coun-
tries (https://www.unhcr.org/tr/unhcr-turkiye-istatistikleri). 
Today, all Syrian nationals in Turkey, and Pales-
tinian refugees who previously resided in Syria, 
are recognized under the status of temporary 
protection, defined under the Law on Foreigners 
and International Protection (Law No. 6458). On 
October 22, 2014, the Council of Ministers issued 
the Temporary Protection Regulation (2014/6883), 
which set an important benchmark in the efforts of 
the government of Turkey to clarify and reinforce 
the overall legal and administrative mechanisms 
surrounding assistance to refugees from Syria. It 
touches on various topics such as non-refoulment, 
registration, and access to basic services including 
health and education. It also refers to access to the 
labor market, social assistance, interpretation and 
similar services, assistance provided by NGOs and 
international organizations, security, and the role 
of various Turkish authorities. 
The Turkish government has made tremendous 
efforts toward hosting what is today the world’s 
largest refugee population in a single country 
and, in recent years, has also taken important 
steps in supporting their longer-term integra-
tion into Turkish society. Nonetheless, refugees’ 
needs remain grave, especially given the scale 
of the matter.2 While refugees, especially those 
settled for some years in Turkey, have improved 
their economic conditions since their arrival, a 
significant percentage still remains poor.3 Despite 
legal changes granting Syrians under temporary 
protection access to work permits, in practice work 
permits remain inaccessible for the vast majority of 
2 For a detailed overview of the multi-sector needs discussed in this 
paragraph, see: K. Biehl et al., Technical Assistance to the EU Facility 
for Refugees in Turkey, European Commission, Final Report 31 Octo-
ber 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/
near/files/updated_needs_assessment.pdf.
3 As an example testifying to this situation, the EU-funded Emergency 
Social Safety Net program targeting the most vulnerable refugees in 
Turkey has assisted around 1.7 million people since 2016. See: https://
ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_19_6212.  
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refugees, and many remain employed informally in 
sectors like agriculture and textile, which are prone 
to poor working conditions and wages. Although the 
state has made significant progress in introducing 
refugee children into the regular public school 
system in Turkey, around 40 percent of the school-
age population remains out of school. Access to 
primary healthcare services for refugees has also 
improved significantly through the establishment 
of Migrant Health Centers across the country, yet 
their scale and outreach are still not sufficient 
to meet the growing demand. There also remain 
substantial shortages in meeting refugees’ access 
to secondary and tertiary schools, as well as mental 
health services. While Turkey has had to shoulder 
many of these burdens alone, since the beginning 
of the crisis the international community, and in 
particular the EU and its member states, have also 
played an important role in supporting Turkey’s 
efforts to meet such needs.4 
4 For an overview on the different actors involved in Turkey’s refugee 
response, see F. Memisoglu and A. Ilgit, “Syrian refugees in Turkey: 
multifaceted challenges, diverse players and ambiguous policies,” 
Mediterranean Politics 22, no. 3 (2017): 317-33.
7EU-T U R K E Y  CO OPE R AT ION  ON  M IGR AT ION  A N D  T H E  I M PACT  OF  T H E 
R E F UGE E  C R I SI S
After Turkey became a candidate for EU acces-
sion in 1999, along with other policy matters, the 
accession process instilled a period of growing 
cooperation between Turkey and the EU on 
migration issues. Turkey has received significant 
financial and technical assistance on migration-
related programs and projects, focused primarily 
on improving and strengthening Turkey’s migra-
tion and border management capacities, including 
support for the preparation of Turkey’s highly 
comprehensive Law on Foreigners and Interna-
tional Protection (Law No. 6458, passed in April 
2013), the establishment of Turkey’s first civilian 
institution on the subject (the Directorate General 
on Migration Management), building reception 
and removal centers for asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants, strengthening border control 
mechanisms, combating human smuggling and 
trafficking, and training relevant staff on migra-
tion and asylum-linked topics. 
Readmission agreements5 have also been central to 
EU-Turkey migration cooperation. Since the early 
2000s, Turkey has signed several readmission 
agreements both with the EU and some source 
countries of irregular migration in the Middle East 
and Central Asia. The signing of the readmission 
agreement with the EU was particularly thorny 
due to the fact that Turkey demanded visa liber-
alization in return but was faced with a reluctant 
Union fearing public repercussions amid growing 
Islamophobia, populism, and Turkey-skepticism 
across the European publics. The decade-long 
5 Readmission agreements enable the return of irregular migrants to 
their own country of citizenship and to countries through which they 
have transited. The EU-Turkey Readmission agreement was signed 
on December 16, 2013. 
readmission/visa controversy was finally resolved 
on December 16, 2013 when the two sides signed 
the Readmission Agreement and the Protocol on 
the Initiation of the Visa Liberalization Dialogue. 
The package stipulated that Turkey would start 
taking back irregular migrants who had entered 
the EU through Turkey three years after the read-
mission agreement entered into force, whereas 
the EU would vote (through a qualified majority) 
to abolish visas for Turkish citizens once Turkey 
completed the EU’s visa liberalization roadmap and 
started to implement the readmission agreement. 
The roadmap that Turkey needed to follow for 
visa-free travel entailed key reforms to strengthen 
border management, establish an asylum system 
in line with international standards, and improve 
Turkey’s human rights record.
After the great summer of migration across the 
Aegean Sea in 2015, EU-Turkey relations reached 
a new level, focusing on increased cooperation to 
overcome the common challenges faced by the 
growing Syrian refugee population in Turkey and 
irregular migration movements into Europe. As 
a strong incentive for Turkey, these discussions 
also included accelerating the visa liberalization 
roadmap and revitalizing Turkey’s EU accession 
process, which had stagnated in previous years. 
Moreover, the EU offered to provide Turkey with 
substantial new funding to meet the needs of refu-
gees. 
To this end, on November 15, 2015, the European 
Commission (EC) reached an agreement with 
the Turkish government on a EU-Turkey Joint 
Action Plan (JAP) identifying various actions to be 
carried out simultaneously by the EU and Turkey 
to address the migration crisis through supporting 
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Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey 
and their hosting communities and strengthening 
cooperation to prevent irregular migration.6 The 
JAP was activated on November 29, 2015 during 
a meeting held between the EU heads of state 
or government and Turkey, where an agreement 
was also reached on a payment of 3 billion EUR 
to Turkey for meeting the needs of refugees and 
their hosting populations. On March 18, 2016, 
a third meeting was held between the members 
of the European Council and Turkey, dedicated 
again to both deepening EU-Turkey relations and 
addressing the migration crisis. As an outcome, 
all parties agreed on the “EU-Turkey State-
ment,” referred to more commonly today as the 
“EU-Turkey deal,” where they reconfirmed their 
commitment to the implementation of the JAP and 
agreed on further measures aimed at deepening 
Turkey-EU relations, curbing irregular migration 
flows, and providing safe and legal routes to the 
EU for those in need. The Statement also included 
further concrete action points and timelines, most 
notably the following: 
• Of all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey 
to the Greek islands after 20 March 2016, those 
who do not apply for asylum and those whose 
claim for asylum is declared inadmissible in 
line with EU and international law will be re-
turned to Turkey (action point 1);
6 The EU commitments include mobilizing substantial funding to sup-
port Turkey in hosting refugees; continuing to provide immediate hu-
manitarian assistance; carrying out a needs assessment in collaboration 
with Turkish authorities as a basis for programming under new funds; 
supporting EU and member state resettlement schemes and programs; 
supporting capacities of Turkey to prevent migrant smuggling; continu-
ing to address root causes of irregular migration (through development 
assistance); better information sharing with both prospective irregular 
migrants (on risks of journey) and Turkish authorities (on smuggling 
networks). Turkey’s commitments include continuing to protect and 
support Syrians in the country; ensuring registration; improving their 
access to basic services, especially education, health, and employment; 
strengthening interception capacities of the Turkish Coast Guard; step-
ping up cooperation with Bulgarian and Greek authorities to prevent ir-
regular crossings and implementing readmission agreements; pursuing 
progressive alignment of visa policies with the EU.
• For every Syrian being returned to Turkey, an-
other Syrian will be resettled to the EU from 
Turkey directly (action point 2);
• The fulfillment of the visa liberalization road-
map will be accelerated with a view to lifting 
the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the 
latest by the end of June 2016. Turkey will take 
all the necessary steps to fulfill the remaining 
requirements (action point 5);
• The EU will, in close cooperation with Turkey, 
further speed up the disbursement of the ini-
tially allocated €3 billion under the Facility for 
Refugees (hereafter referred to as the “Facil-
ity”) in Turkey. Once these resources are about 
to be used in full, the EU will mobilize addition-
al funding for the Facility up to an additional €3 
billion to the end of 2018 (action point 6).
Progress on these different components of the 
agreement between Turkey and the EU has varied 
significantly. On the one hand, the Statement had 
an immediate and rather drastic impact in terms of 
reducing the volume of irregular migration flows 
across the Aegean, as well as the loss of migrant 
lives at sea.7 Progress vis-a-vis returns and resettle-
ments have been steady, though not exactly meeting 
the 1:1 criteria foreseen in the EU-Turkey deal as 
the number of returns from the Greek islands has 
remained low compared to the number of reset-
7 Overall in 2015, there were close to one million arrivals in Europe 
travelling through the Eastern Mediterranean route. This figure 
dropped down to around 182,000 in 2016 and 42,000 in 2017. In 2018, 
the numbers increased slightly to 51,000. The number of fatalities and 
missing persons recorded in the Aegean Sea dropped from 434 in 2016 
to 62 in 2017 and 174 in 2018 (see the first, second, and third annual 
reports on the Facility).
9tlements.8 On the other hand, the number of reset-
tlements taking place has remained low compared 
to the commitment made in the Statement on 
resettling up to 54,000 persons from Turkey.9 On 
the matter of visa liberalization, progress has been 
stalled because of five (out of seventy-two) require-
ments listed in the roadmap that Turkey has 
been unable to fulfill. Out of this five, those that 
necessitated amendments to the Anti-Terror Law 
proved particularly contentious in an era of rising 
nationalism in Turkey. The funding component 
was initially hampered by some delays in payments 
and political negotiations over how they would be 
utilized.10 Eventually, the first 3 billion EUR was 
contracted through 72 projects. Furthermore, in 
March 2018, the European Commission agreed on 
the mobilization of the additional 3 billion EUR for 
the Facility.11 
8 One year after the statement, there were 27,000 arrivals, 1,504 re-
turns, and 9,400 relocations. The Commission and the EU member 
states also committed to providing significant support to the Greek 
authorities in the imple mentation of the EU-Turkey Statement 
and improving migration management and reception conditions in 
Greece. However, progress reports on the EU-Turkey statement sug-
gest that the Greek islands continue to be under great pressure due 
to slow processing of asylum applications, as well as limited capaci-
ty of reception and pre-removal facilities and staff (for example, see: 
European Commission, Seventh Report on the Progress made in the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, COM(2017) 470 final, 
6.9.2017).
9 In the three years since the activation of the Statement, just over 
20,000 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to Europe 
(see: European Commission, Third Annual Report on the Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey, COM (2019) 174 final of 15.4.2019, 4). Overall, the 
willingness of EU member states to take in more refugees has been 
very unsatisfactory. See L. Batalla Adam, “The EU-Turkey Deal One 
Year On: A Delicate Balancing Act,” The International Spectator 52, 
no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 44–58.
10 B. Kale et al., “Asylum Policy and the Future of Turkey-EU Relations: 
Between Cooperation and Conflict,” FEUTURE Online Paper 18 
(2018), http://www.tepsa.eu/feuture-online-paper-no-18-asylum-pol-
icy-and-the-future-of-turkey-eu-relations-between-cooperation-and-
conflict-basak-kale-with-contributions-from-angeliki-dimitriadi-ele-
na-sanchez-montijan/,20.
11 Commission Decision of 14.03.2018 on the Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey amending Commission Decision C(2015)9500 as regards the 
contribution to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. 
Over recent years, numerous academic studies 
have been published about the EU-Turkey deal, 
most being of a critical nature. Numerous studies 
have questioned whether the EU-Turkey deal 
is really about burden sharing or rather burden 
shifting, representing simply a new version of the 
EU’s ongoing “externalization” policies in the 
migration field for keeping unwanted arrivals at 
bay.12 There have been many studies looking at the 
implications of the deal for re-shaping EU-Turkey 
relations, most pointing to the rising functionalism 
behind cooperation.13 Linked to this, studies have 
also examined how this rising functionalism 
around Turkey’s buffer zone position has given 
the Turkish government leverage for maintaining 
illiberal and undemocratic internal politics.14 Last, 
but not least, the returns component of the deal has 
been scrutinized heavily, with many scholars ques-
tioning both its legal and ethical legitimacy from 
the view of international human rights and asylum 
law, especially in view of the question of whether 
Turkey can be considered a “safe third country” 
12 L. Bialasiewicz and E. Maessen, “Scaling rights: the ‘Turkey deal’ and 
the divided geographies of European responsibility,” Patterns Of Prej-
udice 52, no. 2/3 (2018): 210–230; G. Heck and S. Hess, “Tracing the 
Effects of the EU-Turkey Deal: The Momentum of the Multi-layered 
Turkish Border Regime,” Movements Journal 3, no. 2 (2017): 35–56; S. 
Karadag, “Extraterritoriality of European borders to Turkey: an im-
plementation perspective of counteractive strategies,” Comparative 
Migration Studies 7, no. 12 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-
019-0113-y.
13 B. Benvenuti, “The Migration Paradox and EU-Turkey Relations,” In-
stituti Affari Internazionali Working Papers 17/05, 2017, https://www.
iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/migration-paradox-and-eu-turkey-relations; 
Kale et al., “Asylum Policy and the Future”; B. Saatçioğlu, “The Europe-
an Union’s refugee crisis and rising functionalism in EU-Turkey rela-
tions,” Turkish Studies (2019), DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2019.1586542.
14 L. Haferlach et al., “Lessons Learnt from the EU-Turkey Refugee Agree-
ment in Guiding EU Migration Partnerships with Origin and Transit 
Countries,” Global Policy 8, no. 4 (2017): 85–93; A. Okyay and J. Zara-
goza-Cristiani, “The Leverage of the Gatekeeper: Power and Interde-
pendence in the Migration Nexus between the EU and Turkey,” The 
International Spectator 51, no. 4 (2016): 51–66; I. Kfir, “A Faustian pact: 
Has the EU-Turkey deal undermined the EU’s own security?” Compar-
ative Strategy 37, no. 3 (2018): 207–219.
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of return.15 Media reports on the EU-Turkey deal 
are similarly focused on the return component 
of the deal, though in relation to the bureaucratic 
hurdles on the Greek side mainly, highlighting the 
unsafe and inhumane conditions faced by asylum 
seekers who end up stranded indefinitely in the 
Greek island “hotspots” due to serious backlogs 
in processing asylum claims.16 In the following 
section, this paper will propose a slightly different 
angle in looking at a still understudied aspect of the 
EU-Turkey deal, namely its financial and institu-
tional components.17 
15 D. Bulley, “Shame on  EU? Europe, RtoP, and the Politics of  Refu-
gee Protection,” Ethics & International Affairs 31, no. 1 (2017): 51–70; 
B. Frelick, I.M. Kysel, and J. Podkul, “The Impact of Externalization 
of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other 
Migrants,” Journal of Migration and Human Security 4, no. 4 (2016): 
190–220; R. Lehner, “The EU-Turkey-‘deal’: Legal Challenges and 
Pitfalls,” International Migration 57, no. 2 (2019): 176–185; K. Rygiel, 
F. Baban, and S. Ilcan, “The Syrian refugee crisis: The EU-Turkey 
‘deal’ and temporary protection,” Global Social Policy 16, no. 3 (2016): 
315–320; UNHCR, “Legal Considerations on the Return of Asylum 
Seekers and Refugees from Greece to Turkey as Part of the EU–Tur-
key Cooperation in Tackling the Migration Crisis under the Safe Third 
Country and First Country of Asylum Concept,” International Journal 
Of Refugee Law 29, no. 3 (2017): 498–508.
16 For examples of news reports on the third year of the EU-Turkey deal, 
see: (International Press) Elena Becatoros, “3 years on, what’s become 
of the EU-Turkey migration deal?” Associated Press, March 20, 2019, 
https://www.apnews.com/2eb94ba9aee14272bd99909be2325e2b; 
(Turkish press) “EU fails to fulfill commitments as refugee deal marks 
3rd year,” Daily Sabah, March 19, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/
eu-affairs/2019/03/19/eu-fails-to-fulfill-commitments-as-refugee-
deal-marks-3rd-year. 
17 See Den Hertog, who examines the implications of the EU-Turkey 
deal’s financial component for reconfiguring the EU’s budgetary 
systems and funding landscape, and Smeets & Beach, who explores 
the role of different EU institutions in the process leading up to the 
deal. L. den Hertog, “EU Budgetary Reponses to the Refugee Crisis: 
Reconfiguring the Funding Landscape,” CEPS Policy Paper No. 93, 
2016, Brussels: Center for European Public Policy; S. Smeets and 
D. Beach, “When success is an orphan: informal institutional gover-
nance and the EU–Turkey deal,” West European Politics, 2019, DOI: 
10.1080/01402382.2019.1608495.
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I NST I T U T ION A L I Z I NG  EU-T U R K E Y  CO OPE R AT ION:  T H E  FACI L I T Y  F OR 
R E F UGE E S  I N  T U R K E Y
As noted above, an important component of the 
cooperation agreement between Turkey and the EU 
around the migration crisis included the promise 
of substantial, new funding that would support 
Turkey’s efforts in hosting refugees. Between 
2013 and 2015, the European Commission had 
allocated 345 million EUR to Turkey through 
different EU funding instruments, with additional 
support being provided through EU member 
states’ bilateral aid.18 The scale of the promised 
new contributions, however, as well as the ongoing 
urgency of meeting refugees’ basic needs, called for 
better coordination of efforts and swift delivery of 
funds. Therefore, when EU member states called 
for a significant increase in funding to Turkey, 
the Commission adopted a decision on November 
24, 2015 to establish the “Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey” (hereafter “the Facility”),19 as a coordina-
tion mechanism through which EU funding to 
Turkey for supporting refugees is to be channeled. 
This funding included 3 billion EUR for 2016-17 
(the “first tranche”) and, provided all commit-
ments are met, an additional 3 billion EUR for 
2018-19 (the “second tranche”).20 Accordingly, the 
Facility is in charge of managing and coordinating 
all actions financed by the EU in Turkey through 
18 European Commission, First Annual Report on the Facility for Refu-
gees in Turkey COM(2017), 130 final of 2.3.2017.
19 Initially titled the “Refugee Facility for Turkey” in Commission De-
cision C(2015) 9500 of 24 November 2015, the name was changed to 
the “Facility for Refugees in Turkey” through Commission Decision 
C(2016) 60/03 of 10.02.2016.
20 These resources include contributions both from the EU budget and 
from member states integrated into the EU budget. Member state 
contributions amounted to two billion EUR for the 2016-17 period 
and one billion EUR for the 2018-19 period. 
different external EU funding instruments21 to 
support refugees and aims to maximize their effi-
ciency, complementarity, and impact. 
The Facility22 is governed by the Steering 
Committee, which aims to provide both strategic 
guidance on setting priorities and selecting actions 
to be supported, as well as monitoring and assessing 
the implementation of actions and of commitments 
stated by all parties in the EU-Turkey JAP. The 
Steering Committee is composed of two repre-
sentatives from the Commission and one repre-
sentative from each member state, while Turkey 
takes part in an advisory capacity. In determining 
actions to be funded by the Facility, there is an 
emphasis on consultation and cooperation with 
Turkish authorities to ensure shared ownership 
and sustainability and that actions to be funded are 
needs-based.23 
In its funding implementations,24 the Facility 
distinguishes between humanitarian and non-
humanitarian (development) assistance. Humani-
21 These include: Humanitarian Aid Instrument, European Neighbor-
hood Instrument, Development Cooperation Instrument, Instrument 
for Pre-Accession Assistance, and Instrument Contributing to Stabil-
ity and Peace (See 3rd Year Progress Report, 5). 
22 See: European Commission Decision C(2015) 9500 final of 24.11.2015 
on the coordination of the actions of the Union and of the Member 
States through a coordination mechanism – the Refugee Facility 
for Turkey; European Commission Decision C(2016) 855 final of 
10.2.2016 on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey amending Commis-
sion Decision C(2015) 9500 of 24.11.2015.
23 The identification of priority areas for assistance is guided by compre-
hensive and independent needs assessment studies. Reports can be 
found at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news_
corner/migration_en (under “Key Facility Documents”). 
24 The full list of projects funded by the Facility can be seen at: https://
ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/facili-
ty_table.pdf. 
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tarian assistance aims to support the most vulner-
able refugees, addressing protection issues and 
urgent basic needs (including gaps in service provi-
sions for health and education), particularly for 
those who are most vulnerable. Non-humanitarian 
assistance aims at supporting longer-term goals, 
including strengthening refugees’ access to public 
education and health services, as well as improving 
livelihood opportunities and basic infrastructure 
in provinces most impacted by refugee influxes. 
There is also a minor migration management 
component linked to accommodating returns and 
saving lives at sea. 
In the first tranche, the humanitarian strand was 
allocated around 1.4 billion EUR for 45 humani-
tarian projects contracted with 19 partners. 
The European Commission’s Civil Protection 
and Humanitarian Aid Operations Department 
(ECHO) is responsible for overseeing the contracts 
of all humanitarian projects. The largest program 
is the Emergency Social Safety Net, funded nearly 
1 billion EUR, which is implemented by the United 
Nation’s World Food Program (WFP) in collabora-
tion with the Turkish Red Crescent Society and is a 
social assistance program consisting of a debit card 
that delivers monthly, unrestricted, multi-purpose 
cash directly to vulnerable refugees. To date, over 
1.5 million beneficiaries have benefited from the 
program.25 The second is the Conditional Cash 
Transfer for Education program implemented 
by the United Nations International Children’s 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF), funded 84 million 
EUR, which also entails monthly cash transfers 
and has reached the families of over 470,000 chil-
dren attending school. As per ECHO regulations, 
all other projects are also implemented through 
international organizations (UN and NGOs) that 
in turn often work with national and local civil 
society organizations in Turkey.  
25 European Commission, Third Annual Report on the Facility for Refu-
gees in Turkey, COM(2019) 174 final of 15.4.2019. 
Under development assistance, allocated around 
1.6 billion EUR, 26 projects have been contracted 
under the first tranche through 20 partners. 
Projects funded by the Instrument for Pre-
Accession (IPA) and Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace (IcSP), constituting 43 percent 
and 1 percent of the Facility budget, respectively, 
are overseen by the EU Delegation to Turkey. The 
European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations 
manages projects financed by the EU Regional 
Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 
constituting 10 percent of the Facility budget. IPA 
projects are contracted to both Turkish ministries 
and international financial institutions (IFIs). 
This includes a 300 million EUR direct grant to 
the Ministry of Education on a project providing 
close to half a million Syrian children with access 
to education; a 300 million EUR direct grant to 
the Ministry of Health, entailing the establish-
ment of 178 Migrant Health Centers across 
Turkey targeted at the primary healthcare needs 
of Syrians; and a 60 million EUR grant to the 
Directorate General for Migration Management 
for supporting the transportation and hosting 
costs of migrants returned from Greece. Different 
IFIs (including the World Bank, Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau, and Council of Europe Develop-
ment Bank) have been allocated grants ranging 
between 50–250 million EUR for education and 
health infrastructure development projects. There 
are also multiple socio-economic support projects, 
some focused primarily on improving economic 
livelihood opportunities and capacities (i.e., 
through vocational education and training), which 
are implemented mainly by different IFIs and UN 
organizations (UNDP, ILO); others focused on 
a wider range of services (from training courses 
to information and referral services to cultural 
events, etc.) generally provided through commu-
nity centers. Overall, for the first tranche the 
distribution of spending by these different priority 
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areas was 52 percent on education, 28 percent on 
health, 15 percent on socio-economic support, and 
five percent on migration management.
As noted previously, in March 2018 the European 
Commission agreed on the mobilization of the 
additional 3 billion EUR for the Facility. The 
Updated Strategic Concept Note26 approved during 
the Facility’s Steering Committee meeting in June 
2018, as well as the Facility’s 3rd Year Report,27 
point to some of the changes envisioned for the 
second tranche. First, as a more subtle change, the 
Facility’s target populations have been extended 
to include the sizeable population of non-Syrian 
refugees in Turkey who are eligible for subsidiary 
protection and consist of some 300,000 persons 
from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia, and the 
like.28 Second, while areas of priority action (educa-
tion, health, socio-economic support, protection) 
and modes of intervention remain more or less the 
same as in the first tranche, a notable addition is the 
allocation of funding for improving the provision 
of municipal services, including adequate water 
and sanitation conditions for refugees and host 
communities in provinces most impacted. Third, 
a change of discourse can be observed, which is 
evident in the strong emphasis made on the ideas 
of self-reliance and resilience and a progressive 
shift from humanitarian to development assis-
tance that is centered on supporting refugees’ 
employment and integration into the economy. 
Therefore, while funding is still to be allocated 
for meeting refugees’ most basic needs, there is an 
emphasis on transitioning funding priorities and 
objectives from cash-transfer support to active 
26 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/
updated_facility_strategic_concept_note.pdf. 
27 European Commission, Third Annual Report on the Facility for Refu-
gees in Turkey, COM(2019) 174 final of 15.4.2019.
28 On this change, see also: COMMISSION DECISION of 14.3.2018 on 
the Facility for Refugees in Turkey amending Commission Decision 
C(2015)9500 as regards the contribution to the Facility for Refugees 
in Turkey. 
labor market participation. Fourth, while the 
emphasis on cooperation with the Turkish state in 
both deciding and implementing different courses 
of action has remained steady since the inception 
of the EU-Turkey deal, the second tranche places 
more emphasis on ensuring the sustainability of 
the supported projects and their incorporation 
into relevant government systems and programs 
beyond the lifespan of the Facility, given that this 
is the final allocation under the March 2016 deal. 
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M IGR AT ION  CO OPE R AT ION  BE YON D  T H E  EU-T U R K E Y  DE A L?
The discussion above demonstrates that while 
prior to the refugee crisis most migration-related 
EU funding and technical support to Turkey was 
linked with migration management capacities, 
following the refugee crisis it has expanded into 
all fields including humanitarian assistance, 
education, health, livelihoods, social protection, 
and cohesion. As such, through the Facility, the 
EU has started to play a more significant role in 
supporting the long-term integration of refugees 
in Turkey. A key question that emerges from this 
is how the EU-Turkey cooperation on migration 
will be sustained and the direction that it can take 
when the life span of the Facility comes to an end. 
One option for the EU would be to simply return 
to its preferred overseas migration policy support, 
which focuses entirely on migration/border 
management and not on integration. While this 
option may seem easy and practical to European 
policy-makers in the short term, it may have detri-
mental long-term effects on EU member states as 
well as on Turkey. Turkey, already undergoing an 
economic recession with mounting political and 
governance-related problems, is set to experience 
growing public unrest against Syrian refugees, 
which may in turn increase the pressure on them 
to migrate to Europe. The Turkish government’s 
own policies might ease migration to Europe as 
demonstrated in numerous statements in the past 
where the president and ministers have referred to 
“opening the gate if need be” on various occasions. 
While Turkey’s recent incursion into Northern 
Syria may be perceived as an opportunity for the 
return and resettlement of refugees in Syria, that, 
too, assuming that it motivates any returns, would 
not produce an effective solution given the sheer 
scale of the Syrian refugees who are residing in 
Turkey.
Hence, there is an urgent need to think of novel and 
sustainable ways of ensuring EU-Turkey coopera-
tion on migration, which is based on a rights-based 
approach and the long-term integration of Syrian 
refugees. We believe that this cooperation would 
be most effective if it was built on the principle of 
rights-based good governance that targets cohe-
sion in society and is delivered through effective 
inter-institutional cooperation between the central 
government, local governments/actors, and civil 
society organizations in the country. Concerning 
the central government and state institutions, it 
is of key importance for integration that the domi-
nant political discourse of “Turkish hospitality” 
toward refugees is replaced with a rights-based 
discourse. The discourse on hospitality is ineffec-
tive at producing social cohesion mechanisms and 
building a lasting culture of “living together,” thus 
running the risk of increasing resentment between 
the host and the refugee community as well as 
between the refugee community and the central 
administration. The change in discourse should 
be coupled with a change in practices, whereby 
national level legislation and regulations should 
serve to establish effective, inclusive, and rules-
based governance mechanisms that aim at social 
cohesion. The significance of social cohesion as 
the ultimate goal should constitute the main frame 
of the policies designed, especially given the data 
available on the state of Syrian refugees in Turkey. 
It is reported that 98 percent of Syrian refugees 
in Turkey live in urban centers, with 30 percent 
of the overall refugee population under the age of 
10. While the size of the school-aged population is 
high, this is not reflected in the enrollment levels, 
where only 62 percent of the school-aged refugee 
population is enrolled in formal schools. While 
societal cohesion in and through education is 
essential, measures to that end should also target 
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the labor and the health sectors where there is also 
substantial room for improvement. 
In terms of how this will be achieved, it is apparent 
that national legislation alone will not be sufficient 
unless it is coupled with effective implementation 
through strong coordination between the central 
administration (state institutions and the govern-
ment), local actors (municipalities, governorships, 
and district governorships), and civil society 
organizations. For this triad to function well, it 
has to be inclusive, impartial, and non-partisan, 
particularly in the way in which the central admin-
istration and local actors approach civil society 
organizations. Coordination between different 
local actors, in particular between municipalities 
and governorships, also holds key importance. 
We argue that the next step in EU-Turkey coop-
eration on migration should build on the goal of 
attaining this model of good governance that is 
needed for social cohesion and integration. The 
EU can and should directly interact with Turkish 
local actors and civil society organizations in 
capacity-building and the development of effective 
coordination mechanisms. The EU and its member 
states could also work with Turkey in sharing their 
best practices in the area of cohesion and trust-
building. EU institutions themselves could provide 
platforms for such interactions and learning for 
policies that will be adopted at the central level, as 
well as improve coordination between the different 
interlocutors. An EU-Turkey cooperation designed 
on such premises would not only strengthen the 
integration of refugees in Turkey but also entail 
the prospect of making a fundamental pillar of 
EU-Turkey cooperation less transactional and, 
thus, the relationship less toxic.
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